Abstract. Based on resource dependence theory, we have selected 549 M&A events of A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2014 and formed paired samples in M&A according to the different standards using these events, to inspect the role of interlocking board in resolving the information asymmetry problems in M&A. It is shown from results that these companies are more likely to be selected as target companies, which have interlocking board with M&A companies and interlocking board can effectively reduce the information asymmetry in M&A; when there is greater information asymmetry in target companies or M & A companies, private information transmitted by interlocking directors becomes more valuable, so that interlocking board can make use of their information advantage better, which will exert greater impact on M&A target selection. Interlocking board provides effective channels for private information transmission in the process of M&A to mitigate inefficiencies that arise from information asymmetries in target companies or M&A companies.
Introduction
Information friction problem in M & A market has been widely proved by academic circle [1, 2] . Because target companies know more about their own value than merging companies, information asymmetry on target company value arises. Adverse selection caused by information asymmetry of both parties of M&A (hereinafter referred to as both parties) information, will not only influence M&A efficiency for offer [5] , but also reduce M&A performance for increase of M&A cost [6, 7] ; when information asymmetry is serious, these M&A and transaction plans that will success may fail thereby [2] .
It is also found out that target companies and M&A companies have interlocking board in many M&A transactions (Chen Shihua, 2013; Wei Le, 2013) . From perspective of social network theory, establishment of board network interlocking has become an important channel for enterprises to transmit information externally, which is favorable to reduce degree of information asymmetry between enterprises and external world, so as to influence M&A behavior of network participants. It is found out by Schonlau and Singh (2009) that board network centrality has reflected connection and status of board in large company networks. The higher the network centrality is, the more transparent the information is and interlocking board companies can easily acquire information of the Company; therefore, companies with higher board network centrality are more easily to be merging target. However, these researches focus on how information spread externally by board network, while they do not include how external information influences inner decision of enterprises by board network. Therefore, based on research on social network theory, only information transmission to external world in one direction in target companies or M&A companies is considered, without consideration of mutual information communication between target companies and M&A companies, important influence of private information transmitted by interlocking directors on decision of both parties cannot be explained comprehensively.
However, from the perspective of resource dependence theory, generation of interlocking board is a kind of social association with mutual dependence of stability and coordination (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Interlocking board, namely, a kind of relation that both parties dispatch directors to take posts in each other's company mutually, which can help to stabilize mutual change between organization and environment and reduce uncertain relation between boards. In M&A process, interlocking board has established an important channel for both parties to transmit M&A information, which can effectively relieve information asymmetry degree between both parties (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) and can help M&A enterprises to make correct selection. Rousseau and Stroup (2013) hold the opinion: if M&A company selects target company from inner interlocking board, then M&A companies will know more about private information and real value of potential target company, which can reduce excessive payment risks of M&A companies and improve M&A value. Resource dependence theory focusing on direct connection between target companies and merging companies, strengths information communication and exchange between both parties of interlocking board and can explain differences of private information transmitted by interlocking directors on decisions of target companies and M&A companies effectively. However, research based on resource dependence theory lacks support of empirical data; therefore, the Paper tries to check whether private information of interlocking board in M&A process can solve foresaid information asymmetry for both parties. Further, in perspectives of target companies and M&A companies, the Paper respectively check to see how interlocking board will influence M&A target selection when information asymmetry is relatively high.
Theoretical Analysis and Assumption Proposal
In M&A process, information asymmetry between both parties is one of the important reasons why M&A activity cannot be implemented successively and why M&A coordination income cannot be achieved. (Hansen, 1987; Cukurova, 2012) . According to resource dependence theory, motivation of interlocking board is to establish relation between organization and external world and reduce risk and uncertainty of organization and external transactions by establishment of friendship, communication of information and recognition to center organization. (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) Before M&A, interlocking director who holds posts in both parties can help M&A companies to acquire information, such as strategy, market, technology and financial condition, etc. of target companies successively and reduce information searching and investigation cost of M&A companies and to improve reliability degree of information (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). Interlocking director can also provide basic information of M&A companies to target companies and describe M&A intention of M&A companies to help senior managers of M&A companies to make correct judgment and improve probability for M&A invitation acceptance (Useem, 1984) . During M&A process, interlocking board can help M&A company to acquire real value of target companies and improve rationality of offer of M&A companies and reduce excessive payment risk (Cai and Sevilir, 2012) . However, target companies can also acquire relevant information of M&A companies value and will not underestimate real value of M&A companies, so as to reduce dispute and conflict of both parties on M&A price, to reduce negotiation cost and increase income of M&A coordination. After M&A, M&A companies can know advantage resource and enterprise culture of target companies by interlocking board, can prepare reasonable integration plans and measures and can integrate and utilize resources of both parties more effectively (Chen Shihua, et al.). Because directors of target companies also hold posts in M&A companies, it is beneficial to improve recognition and credit of senior managers and employees of target companies on M&A companies, to reduce antipathy during M&A and integration and to reduce integration and coordination costs. Therefore, the Paper puts forward: Hypothesis 1: These companies which have interlocking board with M&A companies are more likely to be selected as target companies.
In large-scale productive companies, information can be transmitted to external world successively (Kang and Kim, 2008). If target companies have foresaid favorable information transmission ability and can reduce asymmetry degree of own value information effectively, private information on target companies acquired by interlocking board is no longer so important and influence of interlocking board on selection of M&A targets will reduce. However, if target companies information acquired by M&A companies only by external public information is very limited and information asymmetry degree of target companies is relatively high, interlocking board relation can let M&A companies directors know "commercial confidentiality" of potential target companies during decision preparation and can effectively reduce information asymmetry of both parties; therefore, private information transmitted by interlocking board will be more valuable. The Paper holds that when information asymmetry degree of target companies is relatively high, interlocking board can better play the role of information channel and influence of interlocking board on M&A target selection will be larger. Therefore, the Paper puts forwards:
Hypothesis 2: when information asymmetry degree of relevant target companies is relatively high, influence of interlocking board on target company selection will be larger.
Because M&A companies know more about their own value compared with target companies, information asymmetry on M&A companies value arises (Hansen, 1987) . Debt will reduce financing ability of company, however, when debt rate of M&A companies is relatively high, M&A companies with financing constraint have to take shares as M&A payment method (Almazan et al., 2010). Under such condition, to avoid underestimating M&A payment costs, M&A companies prefer to merge and acquire board interlocking board companies to better transmit value information to target companies. Therefore, it is believed by the Paper that interlocking board as channel for private information transmission, influence effect of interlocking board on selection of target companies will increase when M&A companies are faced with financing constraint for high lever ratio. Therefore, the Paper puts forward:
Hypothesis 3: when financing constraint exists in M&A companies, influence of interlocking board on selection of target companies will be larger.
Research Design
Based on researches of Bodnaruk, et al. BI (interlocking board) is interlocking board; according to researches of Stuart and Yim (2010), if a director x in board of company j at time t is also director of company k at time t1; t1 is larger than and equal to t-4 and less than and equal to t, then, company j has interlocking board with company k at time t, BI is selected as 1, otherwise as 0.
To investigate influence of interlocking board on selection of M&A target under information asymmetry of target company, the Paper selects information asymmetry level of target companies as substitute variable from four aspects based on previous researches, namely, Return of Equity of target companies (ROE), scale of target companies (SMALL), standard difference of share income of target companies (STD) and industry diversity of M&A companies industry (SI). Besides, the Paper also has investigated function of interlocking board on M&A target selection when M&A companies have financing constraint. Based on previous research, financing constraint in M&A companies can be measured from three aspects, namely, asset debt equity (ADE), accounting flexibility condition (ACR) and accounting mobility (AQ) of M&A companies.
Control is control variable and the Paper selects stock yield (LAGR), stock volatility (VOLR), asset quality (BM), company scale (MV), debt rate (DE), regional overall heterogeneity (SP), senior managers shares (SHARE), equity concentration (CRL), growth (GROWTH), price underestimation degree (PER), industry competition degree (HHI), dual position condition (DUAL), independence of board (IND), scale of board (SCALE), year (YEAR) and industry (IND) as control variables in models herein.
Data in the Paper is from CSMAR database and searches for manual supplementary for several missing data by CNINF and Sina Finance. Interlocking board data are acquired by one-by-one matching for age, gender and resume of directors with the same names in listing companies. Complete data of interlocking board can be acquired by personal data collection of directors in successive 5 years before M&A, while personal information of directors in CSMAR database was disclosed in 1999 at the earliest; therefore, sample interval of interlocking board data herein is 1999-2014 and sample interval of M&A event is 2003-2014. Final quantity of M&A samples herein is 549, of which quantity of M&A samples with interlocking board is 111.
To verify assumption herein, referring to method of Bodnaruk, et al. (2009), the Paper takes A-share companies that belong to the same industry (manufacture industry is classified according to class II code and other industries are classified according to class I code, 21 industry subclasses in total) and have similar scale (market value of these companies is between 70% and 130% in actual company market value) with target companies as matching samples, obtaining 13107 matching samples and 13255 overall samples. To eliminate influence of abnormal value, the Paper has implemented the Winsorize treatment up and down 1% to all successive variables. Table 1 has provided descriptive statistic result for matching samples and has implemented mean value T inspection and rank-sum test. There is significant difference between samples with or without interlocking board: interlocking sample companies are more likely to be M&A targets than non-interlocking companies, which conforms to theoretical expectation of the Paper; interlocking sample companies are more likely to be small-scale companies than non-interlocking sample companies, which is consistent with statistics result: scale of interlocking sample companies is significantly smaller than non-interlocking sample companies; industry, region heterogeneity and finance flexibility of both parties in interlocking sample companies is significantly smaller than non-interlocking sample companies; debt level, company treatment level (mainly embodied in three indexes: equity centralization degree, board dependence and board scale), asset quality, value underestimation degree and industry competition degree of interlocking sample companies are all larger than non-interlocking samples companies. Foresaid statistics result is basically consistent with theoretical estimation of the Paper.
Empirical Research Result
In matching samples, the number of board interlocking samples is 148, where the number of samples of actual M&A events is 105 and the number of samples formed by matching is 43.
See Table 2 for Probit regression results of board interlocking and M&A targets selection and Table 2 has provided regression results to select matching sample by taking industry equivalence and scale similarity as principle. If board interlocking (BI) coefficient of model 1 is significantly positive on 1% level, it shows that companies with board interlocking relation with M&A companies are more likely to be M&A targets and assumption 1 is verified. To verify regulation function of information asymmetry of target companies on relation of board interlocking and M&A target selection, the Paper introduces interaction items of board interlocking and target companies performance (BI*ROE), interaction items between board interlocking and target company scale (BI*SMALL), interaction items between board interlocking and standard difference of share income of target companies (BI*STD) and interaction item between interlocking board and industry diversity of both parties (BI*SI) respectively based on model 1, forming model 2, model 3, model 4 and model 5. Regression coefficient of interaction items of board interlocking and target company performance (BI*ROE) is significantly negative on 5% level, which shows that companies with board interlocking relation with M&A companies are more likely to be M&A targets when performance of target companies is unfavorable; regression coefficient of interaction items between board interlocking and target company scale (BI×SMALL) is significantly positive on 10% level, which shows that companies with board interlocking relation with M&A companies are more likely to be M&A targets when company scale is relatively small; if regression coefficient of interaction items between board interlocking and standard difference of share income of target companies (BI×STD) fails to reach 10% significant level, it shows that there is no significant regulation effect of risk of target companies on relation between board interlocking and target companies selection; on significant level of regression coefficient in interactive items between board interlocking and both parties diversity (BI×SI) on 10% level, the result shows again the importance of transmission for target company information by board interlocking in diversified transaction where M&A companies are in disadvantage status on information.
Generally speaking, foresaid result is consistent with assumption that board interlocking is favorable to overcome information asymmetry of target company value and assumption 2 is verified. When previous performance of company is relatively poor, company scale is relatively small or M&A company belongs to different industries, board interlocking can transmit actual value information on interlocking companies to M&A companies, so as to improve possibility of interlocking companies to become M&A targets and board interlocking plays an important role in the selection of M&A targets.
To verify regulation function of financing constraint of M&A companies on relation of board interlocking and M&A target selection, the Paper introduces interaction items of board interlocking and debt rate of M&A companies (BI×ADE), interaction items between board interlocking and financing flexibility condition of M&A companies (BI×ACR) and interaction item between interlocking board and accounting mobility (BI×AQ) of M&A companies respectively based on model 6, model 7 and model 8. If regression coefficient of interaction items of board interlocking and debt rate of M&A companies (BI×ADE) is insignificant, it shows that relatively high financing leverage of M&A companies fails to make them refer to select board interlocking companies as targets; if regression coefficient of interaction items between board interlocking and financing flexibility condition of M&A companies (BI×ACR) is significantly negative on 10% level, it shows that M&A companies with relatively low financing flexibility refer to select board interlocking companies as targets; if regression coefficient of interaction item between interlocking board and accounting mobility (BI×AQ) is significant on 5% level, it shows that M&A companies with constrained mobility refer to select board interlocking companies as targets.
Foresaid result is consistent with assumption that board interlocking is favorable to overcome information asymmetry of target company value and assumption 3 is verified. When financing flexibility of M&A companies is relatively poor or mobility of M&A companies is constrained, board interlocking can transmit actual value information on M&A companies to interlocking companies, so as to improve possibility of interlocking companies to become M&A targets and board interlocking plays an important role in selection of M&A target selection.
Conclusion
Based on the perspective of resource dependence theory, the Paper has analyzed function of board interlocking on M&A target selection under asymmetry environment. The result shows that: companies with board interlocking relation with M&A companies are more likely to be M&A targets and the conclusion is still correct when potential target companies are divided according to different company characteristics; M&A companies refer to select interlocking companies with relatively poor previous performance and relatively small scale and different from them in perspective of industry as M&A targets; when financing flexibility of M&A companies is relatively poor or mobility of M&A companies is constrained, companies with board interlocking relation with M&A companies are more likely to be M&A targets. It is shown by the result that private information of M&A companies and target companies is more important and board interlocking has established channel to transmit private information of both parties to overcome information asymmetry of both parties. With improvement of information asymmetry of both parties, function of board interlocking will be more significant and influence on selection of M&A target will be increased. Board interlocking can release low efficiency behavior generated by information advantages of target companies and M&A companies during M&A process, which is worth further research.
